Jaringan Islam Liberal
Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) or the Liberal Islam Network is a loose forum for discussing and disseminating the concept of Islamic liberalism in Indonesia. One reason for its establishment is to counter the growing influence and activism of militant and radical Islam in Indonesia. The "official" description of JIL is "a community which is studying and bringing forth a discourse on Islamic vision that is tolerant, open and supportive for the strengthening of Indonesian democratization."
It was started from several meetings and discussions among young Muslim intellectuals in ISAI (Institut Studi Arus Informasi/Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information), Jakarta. and then extended through discussion using a mailing list, email@example.com in early 2001. The founders held the first discussion on February 21, 2001, in Teater Utan Kayu, Jakarta, on Akar-Akar Liberalisme Islam: Pengalaman Timur Tengah (The Roots of Islamic Liberalism: The Middle East Experience), presented by a young progressive scholar, Luthfi Assyaukanie. That meeting was followed by other discussions, either in the form of face-to-face meetings or through the mailing list.
Since mid-2001, the "official" name of Jaringan Islam Liberal has been used on their website, , which displays their activities, articles, discussions, and relevant sources for the dissemination of liberal Islam. Their place of meeting and secretariat is in Teater Utan Kayu, Jakarta, a complex owned by Goenawan Mohamad. a leading journalist and author, and used for arts performances and by non-governmental organizations. By now, the network is led by liberal young thinker, Ulil Abshar Abdalla. who is also the director of ICRP - Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace.
The aim of this book is to encourage mutual understanding between the Islamic and Western worlds. The majority of Muslims are peaceable, law-abiding citizens. However, Muslim fundamentalists, described here as "Islamists", presents a challenge to the values of Western democracies. With many lapses, modern Western societies strive to uphold values such as tolerance, pluralism and individual freedom. Islamism is monolithic, intolerant of dissent and unsympathetic to individual liberty. "Islamic" societies and militant "Islamism" need to be distinguished since a hostile response to Islamist terrorism could quickly become hostility to all Muslims.
It is the hope and intention of the authors that through this book non-Muslims may develop a better understanding of Islam and better relationships with moderate, peaceable Muslims. The fundamental conflict between modern Western societies and modern Islamism is documented here by discussing the writings of key Islamists, past and present, including Osama Bin Laden. The evidence raises many questions and challenges for both Muslims and non-Muslims.
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Siapa sajakah yang mereka daftar sebagai Islam Liberal?
Dalam internet milik mereka, ada sejumlah nama. Kami kutip sebagai berikut:
“Beberapa nama kontributor JIL (Jaringan Islam Liberal, pen) adalah sebagai
Mereka itu diperlukan untuk mengkampanyekan program penyebaran gagasan
keagamaan yang pluralis dan inklusif. Program itu mereka sebut “Jaringan Islam
Penyebaran gagasan keagamaan yang pluralis dan inklusif itu di antaranya
disiarkan oleh Kantor Berita Radio 68H yang diikuti 10 Radio; 4 di Jabotabek
(Jakarta Bogor, Tangerang, Bekasi) dan 6 di daerah.
Di antaranya Radio At-Tahiriyah di Jakarta yang menyebut dirinya FM Muslim
dan berada di sarang NU tradisionalis pimpinan Suryani Taher, dan juga Radio
Unisi di Universitas Islam Indonesia Yogyakarta. Dua Radio Islam itu ternyata
sebagai alat penyebaran Islam Liberal, yang fahamnya adalah pluralis, semua
agama itu sama/ paralel, dan kita tak boleh memandang agama lain dengan pakai
agama kita. Sedang faham inklusif adalah sama dengan pluralis, hanya saja
memandang agama lain dengan agama yang kita peluk. Dan itu masih dikritik oleh
Bahaya Islam Liberal Sekular dan Menyamakan Islam dengan Agama Lain
Penulis: Hartono Ahmad Jaiz
Joseph A. Massad
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Ulil Abshar Abdalla — (b. 11 January, 1967) is an Islamic scholar from Indonesia affiliated to Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islam Network). He comes from a family of Nahdlatul Ulama background: His father Abdullah Rifa i is from pesantren Mansajul Ulum (Mansajul… … Wikipedia
Geografie Somalias — Satellitenaufnahme Somalias Die Geographie Somalias ist die Geographie des östlichsten Landes Afrikas. Somalia erstreckt sich über eine Fläche von 637.657 km² und besteht größtenteils in Wüste. Höchste Erhebung ist der Shimbiris (2.450 m).… … Deutsch Wikipedia
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Sam Gerrans is an English writer, translator, support counselor and activist. He also has professional backgrounds in media, strategic communications and technology. He is driven by commitment to ultimate meaning, and focused on authentic approaches to revelation and realpolitik. He is the founder of Quranite.com – where the Qur’an is explored on the basis of reason rather than tradition – and offers both individual language training and personal support and counseling online at SkypeTalking.com.
Published time: 19 Apr, 2016 10:28 Edited time: 19 Apr, 2016 10:39
© Suzanne Plunkett / Reuters
No matter what the question, the liberal response is the same: native Europeans need to understand, ‘celebrate’ difference, and be willing to integrate alien ideologies – because it’s so enriching. But if it is all so enriching, liberals struggle to explain to themselves and others why Islamic communities are not ‘celebrating’ their own differences.
On March 24, 2016, a Muslim shopkeeper – forty-year-old Asad Shah – was viciously attacked in Glasgow. He later died from his injuries.
Naturally, the social engineering project otherwise known as mainstream media jumped – self-loathing first – into the fray. The Spectator’s Douglas Murray – writing on March 29th – summarized the situation well: "Most of the UK press began by going big on this story and referring to it as an act of ‘religious hatred’, comfortably leaving readers with the distinct feeling that – post-Brussels – the Muslim shopkeeper must have been killed by an ‘Islamophobe’".
In the event, it came to light that poor Mr Shah had been murdered not by a white hater, but by another Muslim. Tanveer Ahmed, a taxi-driver from Bradford.
Why? Because Mr Shah had claimed – apparently – to be a prophet.Seal of the prophets
Islam – a word which in the Qur’an is nothing more than an abstract noun meaning ‘submission’ – comprises today, in effect, a broad political narrative broken up into competing factions. One of the few things they all agree upon is the infallibility of the Qur’an.
The Qur’an says that Muhammad is the ‘seal of the prophets’. Although ‘seal’ can indicate a confirmation of authenticity – and the message given to Muhammad undoubtedly confirms previous prophets – Traditionalist Islam chooses to take this Qur’anic statement to mean that no prophet will follow Muhammad.
Well, okay; let’s assume that view. Surely, the rational response, given such a premise, to anyone who claims to be a prophet – such as Mr Shah reportedly did – would be simply to smile and explain calmly why he is wrong.
Euclid set out the basis for modern mathematics. If someone now claims that twice two is five, stabbing one thus deluded to death does not suggest itself as the obvious response – at least, not if you are sure of your premises.
The vast majority of people from Islamic backgrounds have a cultural rather than ideological attachment to their religions. Most know the Qur’an no better than most nominal Christians know the New Testament. Like most people anywhere, most Muslims go with the flow. What they want is what most people want: a better and more secure life for themselves and their families.
But facts are facts; the more ‘religious’ a Traditionalist Muslim is, the more likely he is to consider it not only acceptable but praiseworthy that those who do not conform to his own orthodoxy should expect retribution; in addition, cultural Muslims are at risk – perhaps more at risk – from the insane brigade as anyone, a fact to which the murder of Mr Shah attests.Rashad Khalifa
Take the case of Rashad Khalifa. Khalifa – an Egyptian who moved to the US – discovered and expounded upon a mathematical code within the Qur’an based on the number 19. Harmless enough you might think.
Khalifa never claimed to be a prophet (Arabic: nabī); but as his calculations progressed, he did claim to be a messenger (Arabic: rasūl).
Technically, anyone who delivers a message is a messenger – and the Qur’an does not contain any statement about messengers comparable to the one it makes about Muhammad being the ‘seal of the prophets’. But the type of people who think errors in judgment merit killing rather than raised eyebrows are not sensitive to this sort of distinction, and Khalifa was summarily stabbed to death in 1990.
Bilal Philips presents himself as a spokesman for Traditionalist Islam. He is not an extremist, nor can liberals claim him to be religiously illiterate. He is a writer and preacher schooled in – and whose audience consists of – a certain bandwidth within the Sunni orthodoxy. But even Philips conflates the concept of prophet and that of messenger in Khalifa’s case, and barely conceals his glee at his murder.Covering up
Whereas the liberal narrative must assume that all cultures are equally valid and – given enough cuddles and understanding – will want to live together in perfect harmony, that fact is that the Shah case has belied those assumptions.
The best western media can do when wrong-footed by later events as in the Shah case is to switch the focus to those decent, reasonable Muslims who don’t want to slice people up for having a wrong opinion or for being deluded and foolish – which seems the worst that can be said about Mr Shah. So we have a damage limitation program underway concentrating on good Muslims.
The Guardian’s piece. for example, ignores the actual reason that the murderer himself gave for the attack (that Mr Shah claimed to be a prophet) and focuses instead on what liberals like best: a generalised discussion about the evils of ‘hate’ – in this case in combination with a short tour of tensions between the generality of Islamic sects and a group called the Ahmadis, to which Mr Shah belonged.
And while it is true that the Ahmadis are, generally speaking, both reasonable relative to Islamic orthodoxy and persecuted by it, these are not the salient facts in this case. The salient fact is that Shah claimed to be a prophet and that is why he was killed.
And this is a problem for the liberal narrative. The idea of assassinating a man who says he is a prophet is not something one can claim exists only at the nuttier fringes of Islam – and this is what the liberal press is trying to keep the mainstream from grasping. It chooses, rather, to operate on the same basis on which it approaches everything: the problems with Islam can be solved by the cure-all of attacking ‘hate’ – and assumes Islam in all its manifestations can or should be amenable to a transformation on that basis.
But it won’t. If you go around saying you are a prophet in the world of Islam – or even if you don’t say it but someone thinks you did – you should expect people to be out to kill you. It really is that simple.Two banks of the river
I was friendly some years ago with a young Muslim who told me his parents had moved to the UK from a squalid and backward village in Bangladesh. The entire village came.
Back in the village, those who lived on one side of the river had hated those who lived on the other side of the river. When they arrived in England the first thing they did was open a mosque. When they had finished drawing up their mosque’s Articles of Association, the item at the top of the list was the stipulation that people originally from the other side of the river back in Bangladesh should not be allowed into it.
Central to the liberal narrative is the thesis that if you are understanding enough, tolerant enough, embracing enough and do enough ‘celebrating’ of everyone’s differences, eventually people will all come round to being like liberals: gushy, blindly optimistic utopians with a misguided though perhaps well-intentioned set of motives.
This is – at best – a strategy for failure; at worst a cynical ploy providing cover to well-meaning fools to execute a policy of betrayal against their own civilization. To put it in Classical terms, liberals are not only throwing open the gates of Troy; they themselves built the horse and are wheeling it in.
One may understand those Muslims who moved to the west since WWII. Since the ramparts were down, they came in. Why wouldn’t they? In their place, I know I would – it is normal and understandable to want a better life.
But the fact remains that had they successfully built and maintained desirable societies – societies in which you don’t get chopped up for having a wrong opinion, for example – many would have had no impetus to come.
I do not believe that there is any intention to help Islamic communities solve their problems in Europe; rather that they are being used cynically by those who control policy to achieve the cultural balkanisation of European peoples. But if the liberals were serious about helping Islamic cultures in the west, the way to do that is not do defer to them, but to stand firm in the principles of those thinkers who made European civilizations attractive in the first place.
If that does not happen, in time Europe will no longer be Europe; it will be a ramshackle, medieval backwater lost in factional religious infighting, and the liberals – along with the decent Muslims and rest of us – will just have to keep their mouths shut for fear of being murdered by fanatics.
The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.
Examines the experiences of women activists of the Islamist Refah (Welfare) party in Turkey.
In Turkey, no secular party has approximated the high levels of membership and intense activism of women within the Islamist Refah (Welfare) Party. Rethinking Islam and Liberal Democracy examines the experiences of these women, who represented an unprecedented phenomenon within Turkish politics. Using in-depth interviews, Yeşim Arat reveals how the women of the party broadened the parameters of democratic participation and challenged preconceived notions of what Islam can entail in a secular democratic polity. The women of the party successfully mobilized large groups of allegedly apolitical women by crossing the boundaries between the social and the political, reaching them through personal networks cultivated in private spaces. The experiences of these women show the contentious relationship between liberal democracy and Islam, where liberalism that prioritizes the individual can transform, coexist, or remain in tension with Islam that prioritizes a communal identity legitimized by a sacred God.
“Arat’s book is remarkable for its in-depth examination of the dynamics of women’s participation in the [Welfare Party’s] Islamist political networks, their reasons for being drawn to the movement and for becoming activists, the impact of their activism on their daily lives and relationships, and their aims and frustrations … Arat gives very detailed and fascinating information.” — Contemporary Islam
“…this book is unique in that it provides an insight into the discourse and self-conceptualizations of a unique group of Islamist political activists … Arat provides a firsthand account of the lives, thoughts, and views of these women that goes far beyond the superficial and quite biased image that is attributed to them popularly by the secular media.” — International Journal of Middle East Studies
“Along with its encompassing, detailed and well-crafted arguments, this book is a great contribution for students of gender, Islam and democracy and is recommended to anyone who is ready to take up fresh original research on women, Islam and politics and to hear the voices of Islamic women in Turkish politics.” — International Feminist Journal of Politics
“…a welcome addition to the remarkably rich academic discourse on Islam in contemporary Turkey…” — Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies
“Arat … is interested in what attracts Islamist women to active political participation, how they were recruited, how they recruit others, and what values they manifest.” — Comparative Politics
“Rethinking Islam and Liberal Democracy is a very useful and informative book.” — Perspectives on Politics
“This study is commendable for documenting a period of recent Turkish history, and for doing so from the point of view of the participants themselves.” — Middle East Journal
“Rethinking Islam and Liberal Democracy is historically grounded, well researched, and smoothly argued. It is a welcome addition to the growing literature that goes beyond dichotomies of secular and religious women’s activism and attempts to see how these currents cross-fertilize each other in multiple ways. I highly recommend it.” — Afsaneh Najmabadi, author of Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity
“This book stands apart in its balance and its attempt to understand how female Islamists see themselves, their religion, and the movement.” — Beth Baron, author of Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics
Yeşim Arat is Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Boğaziçi University, Istanbul. She is the author of The Patriarchal Paradox: Women Politicians in Turkey and the coeditor (with Barbara Laslett and Johanna Brenner) of Rethinking the Political: Gender, Resistance, and the State
Table of Contents
1. Women of the Republic and Islam: Between the Private and the Political
2. Refah Party and the Organization of the Ladies' Commissions
3. Women in the Organization
4. Mobilizing for the Party: From the Personal into the Political
5. Worldviews of Refah Women
Appendix: Questions Used in the Interviews
Which way will Egypt go now that Husni Mubarak's authoritarian regime has been swept from power? Will it become an Islamic theocracy similar to Iran? Will it embrace Western-style liberalism and democracy? Egypt after Mubarak reveals that Egypt's secularists and Islamists may yet navigate a middle path that results in a uniquely Islamic form of liberalism and, perhaps, democracy. Bruce Rutherford draws on in-depth interviews with Egyptian judges, lawyers, Islamic activists, politicians, and businesspeople. He utilizes major court rulings, political documents of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the writings of Egypt's leading contemporary Islamic thinkers. Rutherford demonstrates that, in post-Mubarak Egypt, progress toward liberalism and democracy is likely to be slow.
Essential reading on a subject of global importance, this edition includes a new introduction by Rutherford that takes stock of the Arab Spring and the Muslim Brotherhood's victories in the 2011-2012 elections.
"A fascinating and timely book. [Rutherford] details the long and persistent struggle of the judiciary to carve out an independent role for itself, even under a military dictatorship."--Fareed Zakaria, Time
"[Readers will] be rewarded by Rutherford's ambitious effort to explain how significant political actors, specifically, the Muslim Brotherhood, the judiciary, and the business sector, can work in parallel, if not exactly together, to influence the country's trajectory over time. This is a novel approach to analyzing Egyptian politics."--Steven A. Cook, Foreign Affairs
"[Egypt after Mubarak ] clearly offers both an insightful account of Egyptian politics and a potentially fruitful framework for future comparative research on political change in the Arab world."--Waleed Hazbun, Perspectives on Politics
"Bruce Rutherford thoroughly analyzes the dynamics and personalities of Egyptian politics and the prospects for Egypt once its pro-Western president, Hosni Mubarak, passes on."--Sheldon Kirschner, Canadian Jewish News
"The author has studied closely the Brotherhood's campaign documents, and the book is based on primary sources. No student of the region can afford to ignore it."--A. G. Noorani, Frontline
"An important work, filled with valuable information and insight. Beyond the rich detail about Egypt, Rutherford's study deepens our understanding of how the characteristics of both an authoritarian and a democratic political order come together and persist in the hybrid regimes of the Arab world."--Mark Tessler, University of Michigan
Table of Contents:
Introduction to the Paperback Edition ix
CHAPTER 1 Hybrid Regimes and Arab Democracy 1
CHAPTER 2 Liberal Constitutionalism: Preserving and Adapting Egypt's Liberal Tradition 32
CHAPTER 3 Islamic Constitutionalism: The Political Goals of Moderate Islam 77
CHAPTER 4 The Decline of Statism and the Convergence of Political Alternatives 131
CHAPTER 5 Economic Restructuring and the Rise of Market Liberalism 197
CHAPTER 6 Liberalism, Islam, and Egypt's Political Future 231
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